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amount of second-century testimony to the son of Zebedee as the author—gives Bousset little pause. He answers that the confusion between the two Johns, the apostle and the presbyter, began soon after the close of the Johannine writings, and spread rapidly; and he appeals to the corresponding confusion between Philip the apostle and Philip the evangelist; also to the silence of Polycrates and other authorities as to the presence of the apostle at Ephesus.

On other matters, including the date, Bousset adheres pretty completely to the views adopted in his first edition. But the whole work has undergone thorough revision, and every page bears witness to the care with which the writer has weighed the arguments of Weiss and others. The ultimate point at issue between them is one of the greatest interest for the valuation of the book. It amounts to this: Granted that two hands have been at work, which of them, the earlier or the later, is to be regarded as the truly creative or formative influence, so as to deserve the title of author? Bousset, ascribing a little more both of making and of shaping to the second, calls him the author, and dates the work in the early nineties; Weiss regards this as the hand rather of an editor, and, ascribing a good deal more both of contents and of coherence to the work as it reached his hand, would call the earlier of the two the author, and find the bulk of the book in a Christian apocalypse of the time of Vespasian. We cannot say that Bousset has convinced us that the first three chapters are necessarily late and due to "the last hand." And if they are seen to belong to the other large sections of the book which either may or must have an earlier date assigned to them, the arguments for assigning a Vespasianic date to at least the first edition of the Apocalypse will continue to gather force. Bousset's new addition marks a distinct advance over even his own first edition in the direction of sober and convincing exegesis; but a comparison between the two is so instructive that we should not care to be without either.

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#### RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

Albert Rivaud has presented two excellent studies in philosophy. The first<sup>1</sup> considers the problem of becoming as found in Greek philosophy, and its relation to our modern notion of matter. By means of a historical analysis of Greek thought from the dawn of culture until Theophrastus,

<sup>1</sup> *Le problème du devenir et la notion de la matière dans la philosophie grecque depuis les origines jusqu'à Theophraste.* Par Albert Rivaud. 1 vol. Paris: Alcan, 1906. viii+488 pages. Fr. 7.50.

it aims to prove that our conception of matter was unknown to the Greeks, though it was sometimes approached, and that its place was taken by the notion of becoming or change. The data upon which such a study must rest confessedly involve much of hypothesis; yet the author has made critical use of current literature and has justified his positions in valuable notes. He regards the Greek myth as presenting the elements of Greek science; it is an attempt to rationalize the idea of change. All that science could do was to complete the process with the aid of observation and logic. The rise of logic among the Eleatic philosophers; the various attempts to reconcile reason and experience on a theory of atoms or elements; the efforts of the Sophists, at the very head of whom our author places Zeno and Melissus, either to insist on the continuity of change or else to deny it entirely; the influence of medical science on the concept of body; the endeavor to state the order of change by some rational concept such as geometrical form, together with the notions of a hierarchy of forms and of a periodic return—all are carefully traced. But, "no term is met which can exactly correspond to our word 'matter.' . . . None defines the permanent substance, resisting and solid reality which subsists under phenomena." Such is the result of a critical examination of the vocabulary of physics up to Plato. There are, of course, many things that point toward a theory of matter, such as generation and decay, metamorphoses, religious conceptions of the body as the tomb of the soul, logical conceptions of being, and the medical notion of matter. The contribution of Plato and Aristotle was merely in the direction of giving coherence and unity to existent theories. Plato has no word equivalent to "matter." In fact, all Platonic physics is myth, for science arises in sensation and opinion. The suggestion is made that the *Timaeus* is capable of intelligent interpretation if *χώρα* be regarded as the theater where becoming takes place. The real problem of Plato is that of the participation of phases of disorder in order. The latter belongs properly only to the realm of ideas. The solution is, in the end, effected by a world-soul. Plato is the first to present a concept of nature. Aristotle follows Platonism. Matter is still becoming, even though it be regarded at times as a substratum. Matter is dynamic, and this force or power which is matter produces change in a definite order and unites being and becoming. Perfect being has no becoming, but everything else belongs to nature which is teleological. Each thing in the process of becoming realizes a form. What that form may be can be learned only from experience and induction. Real being consists, therefore, in a complex of matter (becoming) and form. In any primitive sense matter is an unknowable, negating everything of

reality; it is indeterminate, changing, disordered. Becoming is found somewhere between opposing qualities, so that matter would be the center of all oppositions and is a logical substratum rather than a reality in any true sense. To the visibility of Platonic body Aristotle adds tangibility. His teleology alone saves Aristotle from a thoroughgoing materialism. In the hands of his commentators only his method was conserved, and a more modern concept of matter was substituted.

The second study<sup>2</sup> deals with the Spinozistic notions of essence and existence. The method is historical, successively dealing in chronological order with the various writings of Spinoza. All texts referred to are cited in the notes and, in connection with the index, form a desirable glossary of Spinoza's works. In the vast field of bibliography use has purposely been made only of the most recent works. The aim of the author has been to assemble and interpret the texts in Spinoza relative to the distinction of essence and existence. Such a task necessarily touches upon every point of Spinoza's philosophy, because of the centrality of the problem of being in his thinking. He both distinguishes essence from existence and confounds them. Yet in God alone does he regard essence and existence as identical. This is the justification for the ontological argument. Everywhere else the ideal and the real are distinct, so that the Spinozistic pantheism is not monistic. God is the immediate cause of essence and the mediate cause of existence. All true knowledge is of essence, but we know essence only through God. Eternity, and consequently immortality, belongs only to essence. God is necessary essence. He does not exist in time, but in eternity. He has no true perception nor thought. Spinoza uses the same expressions to describe both essences and existences. This implies the reality of the world of sense. Yet at other times he contrasts essence and existence. A similar contradiction is found in his conception of God as immobile, yet as producing or causing essences. All modes of extension are united under the concept of *Facies totius universi*, and those of thought by the *Intellectus infinitus*. Man is a microcosm. Each human intellect is a reduced copy of the universal intellect. Its essence is the divine intellect itself. Yet the fact that the body is perishable suggests a duality. As a matter of fact, however, consciousness of eternity is derived only through fullness of the sensuous life. God is found within, at the depth of the human soul. The result of our author's study is the conviction that it is a supreme interest in human immortality that leads Spinoza to confound existence

<sup>2</sup> *Les notions d'essence et d'existence dans la philosophie de Spinoza*. Par Albert Rivaud. 1 vol. Paris: Alcan, 1906. viii+216 pages. Fr. 3.75.

and essence in God, and very frequently in inferior beings who do not know how to live the life eternal, while he distinguishes them only in man.

The value of these two works for the theologian is not insignificant. The first contains a treatment of a historical phase of the problem of reality that must be taken into account in a scientific formulation of the sensible universe. Such a formulation is a necessary introduction to theology. The importance and worth of a careful analysis of the Spinozistic philosophy with reference to its fundamental concepts does not need elaboration. No modern thinker, and least of all in the theological field, can escape a reckoning with it.

A small pamphlet<sup>3</sup> discusses interestingly the relation of Schiller to religion. Schiller never made religion one of his themes. He has no great religious characters. Problems such as soul-gropings after truth, nature in a narrow sense, the circle of childhood, the relation of man and woman, folk-study, did not enter his thought. Culture and thought were the only avenues of religion left open to him; hence religion was merely a derivative. Jesus' personality meant nothing to him. God was idea. Ethics displaced religion. Culture and reflection were the sole sources of his religious coloring. His idealism is akin to religion, but is not religion. God, faith, feeling, obedience, hope, lack personal meaning. Art and morality are united against religion rather than uniting with it into a perfect whole.

The posthumous volume of Shields's *Philosophia ultima*<sup>4</sup> contains essays on "The Scientific Problems of Religion" and "The Christian Evidences of the Physical and Psychical Sciences." It is forty-five years since the publication of Shields's first essay, and nearly thirty since that essay was expanded into a larger work. This work, in turn, was republished in the present-day form. The first volume appeared in 1888, and the second in 1889. The author was intent upon establishing the harmony of science and religion on philosophic principles, in this way securing a *philosophia ultima*. Modern thought has passed beyond phases of Dr. Shields's problem. In the field of apologetics, for instance, he believes that "the great works of Paley and Butler with their acknowledged defects . . . are not likely to be very soon supplanted." Comte, Hegel, and Hamilton are his philosophic adversaries. In theology he is a conservative, and in epistemology a naïve realist. His real interest lies in the

<sup>3</sup> *Schillers Stellung zur Religion*. Von Adolph Schmitthenner. Berlin: Schwetschke, 1905. 32 pages. M. 0.50.

<sup>4</sup> *Philosophia ultima; or, Science of the Sciences*. Vol. III. By Charles Woodruff Shields. New York: Scribner, 1905. lxxviii+228 pages. \$3.

fact that he attempted, in the second volume of his work, a classification of the sciences which he urges as historical, logical, and practical. Religion he regards as the metaphysical complement of the sciences. In its day the author's doctrine was looked at askance because he suggested the fallibility of dogmas supposed to be based on Scripture. His programme for his work was never completed, nor does the present volume advance it toward completion. In a sense it is supplementary. Any who are curious may glean the essence of the former volumes, with some modern emendations, in the brief statement prefixed to this. The bulk of the work is taken up with extolling Butler, condemning Strauss, and presenting a scientific argument for religion. To our author the Bible "cannot but be infallible and inerrant, the very Word of God;" "it is only our human interpretation that is fallible and errant." He welcomes criticism that recognizes this canon. The practiced reader will recognize the result. The Bible is a source, not only of religion, but also of scientific teaching.

The biography of Dr. Shields which the volume contains is interesting as throwing light on the life of the writer, and as giving the motive for his work. Thought, however, is advancing so rapidly that this volume seems like a voice from the past.

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### KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

Under the above title Professor Gwatkin presents to the public his Gifford Lectures of 1904 and 1905.<sup>1</sup> He deals with his subject in a comprehensive manner, seeking in the first series to bring out the contribution which natural theology makes to our knowledge of God, and in the second to sum up the salient contributions of history.

In the apologetical task the author starts with the argument for the possibility of a revelation of God.

If there is a God—a personal Being above us and not below us—I think we may take it as possible that he may have something to reveal; and then, if he is able to reveal it, if he may be supposed willing to do so, and if man is able to receive it—on these four conditions revelation is possible, and the question whether or how far there is a revelation in such or such facts is simply a question of evidence.

This sentence gives a very good idea of the method employed in the first series of lectures. Dealing first with the supposition of the existence of

<sup>1</sup> *The Knowledge of God*. By Henry Melvill Gwatkin. 2 vols. New York: Scribner, 1906. Vol. I, 308 pages; Vol. II, 330 pages. \$3.75 net.